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The countries of the so-called Arab spring now have to move from popular 
protest to lasting institution-building. In this context, a multiplicity of voices 
has been advocating Turkey as a model for the democratic and economic de-
velopment of Arab states. This essay critically examines the Turkish model 
and emphasizes its particularities that strongly differentiate Turkey from its 
southern neighborhood. 
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pring is over and the difficult process of building new institutions has begun. 
This applies at least to Tunisia and Egypt, whereas Libya never experienced a 
spring but a bloody civil war whose aftermath still is uncertain. In Tunisia, the 
Islamist Ennahda party achieved impressive 41 percent of the votes in the first 
free elections, and its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, promised to take his example 
not in fundamentalist ideologies of an Islamic state but rather in the way in 
which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has governed Turkey in the 
past decade. Already upon his return from London to Tunis, Ghannouchi told 
his followers and the world press that Turkey is his model. In this way, he 
shared the cacophony of voices that has been advocating Turkey as a model for 
the reformation of crumpling authoritarian Arab states. This essay will critically 
examine the Turkish experience and cast some doubt over the all-too easy sug-
gestion that Arab states should follow the “Turkish model”. 
In September 2011, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
touring Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, making himself the most pronounced advo-
cate of the Turkish model. Thereby, his promotion of a combination of democ-
racy, secular statehood, liberal market economy and Islamic values represented 
pretty much the self-image of the incumbent AKP government in Turkey. The 
unrest in the Arab world has given Erdoğan an opportunity to jump on the 
bandwagon of Arab popular movements in order to enhance his legitimacy at 
home, to support the AKP’s struggle against Turkey’s Kemalist establishment 
and to present the country as a rising regional power against the backdrop of 
the stalemate in the EU accession negotiations between Ankara and Brussels. 
Moreover, an active Turkish foreign policy in the region is meanwhile a must 
due to the increasing importance of Arab states as export markets for Turkish 
products and construction industries. 
At the same time, the performance of the AKP government has become a 
central reference point for the ongoing debate about the compatibility of Islam 
and democracy that has occupied western audiences in the past years. In reject-
ing the Islamist label and branding itself as a Muslim conservative party, the 
AKP seized the opportunity which post 9/11 international politics has offered. 
The party combined a limited Islamization of Turkish society with the democra-
tization of its political and the liberalization of its economic institutions. In light 
of the political importance of Islamist movements in the Arab world, many 
western politicians, academics and media pundits have been happily taking up 
the AKP’s self-image in order to propagate the compatibility of Islam and de-
mocracy and to counter the threat of anti-western Islamist rule in the region 
which has been the political nightmare scenario for the West in the past dec-
ades. 
Finally, Islamist movements in the region themselves increasingly refer to the 
AKP as a model in their strategies to seize political power. In light of the pre-
dominantly non-religious character of the popular unrest in the Arab world, 
many Islamist parties have fully appropriated the global discourse on democra-
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cy, integrating popular demands for accountability and rule of law into their 
Islamist worldviews. In adopting the Turkish model, these parties do not only 
try to appeal to the democratically minded non-religious constituencies at 
home; they also indicate international actors that they are willing to play poli-
tics according to contemporary rules of the game. 
By closer inspection, the Turkish model which this heterogeneous group is 
advocating with respect to the transformation of the Arab world is in fact an 
AKP model, predicated on the assumption that the task is first and foremost to 
open an avenue for Islamist movements toward democracy and political plural-
ism. Thereby, these advocates of the AKP model overestimate the role the AKP 
has played in the transformation of Turkish politics and society. To be sure, in 
particular between 2002 and 2005 the AKP government has conducted dramatic 
reforms of Turkey’s legal structures and public institutions, as well as imple-
mented a turn in the means and directions of foreign policy that addressed 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighborhood in a more active and independent way 
without deviating from Ankara’s traditional path of integration with the West. 
However, it would be wrong to give the credit for Turkey’s transformation to 
the AKP alone. Most of the reform trajectories have not been initiated by the 
party; the AKP only accelerated and intensified a transformation which already 
has been under way. In terms of economic liberalization, for instance, the AKP 
enhanced and developed further the direction already taken by the previous 
Prime Minister (1983-89) and President (1989-93) Turgut Özal. Changes in Tur-
key’s foreign policy formulation already occurred under Foreign Minister 
İsmail Cem (1997-2002) who combined Turkey’s EU membership request with 
an opening to the country’s neighborhood on the Balkans, the Black Sea region, 
the Caucasus and the Middle East. There is no doubt that remarkable figures of 
economic growth under AKP rule have pushed Turkey into the G 20 group. 
However, a major structural background for Turkey’s economic success can be 
found in its relationship to the EU. Turkey’s exports to the EU comprise about 
45 percent, while Middle Eastern states figure – even after a dramatic increase 
of their share - with still only 20 percent of Turkey’s total exports. Even more 
important, with more than 75 percent, the overwhelming source for Foreign 
Direct Investment in Turkey remains to be the EU. Last but not least, the eco-
nomic politics of the AKP benefited a lot from the customs union between Tur-
key and the EU which was concluded in 1995 and resulted in a thorough trans-
formation of the legal economic structures of the country. 
The promotion of Turkey as a model for Arab states must put the AKP into 
Turkish political context. The political success story of the AKP is due to three 
crucial developments that are inseparably linked to the path-dependent struc-
tural transformation of Turkey mentioned in the paragraph above. Firstly, in its 
ideological outlook the party followed the line of its predecessor, the Virtue 
Party (Fazilet), in adopting the globally dominant discourse on democracy and 
human rights. Secondly, in mobilizing broad political support for democratic 
legitimacy among the Turkish electorate, it has made references to Islamic 
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norms and values, while abandoning the Islamist rhetoric of the National Out-
look movement under the grand old man of Turkey’s nationalist religious polit-
ical wing Necmetin Erbakan. Finally, the AKP has built up a support base 
among liberal groups in Turkish society for achieving the necessary popular 
recognition as a legitimate political actor within Turkey’s multi-party system. 
Given the increasingly authoritarian and intolerant behavior of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan at home, the successful confluence of these developments might reach 
an end if the liberal constituencies in Turkish politics and economics move 
away from supporting the AKP. With respect to Erdoğan’s promotion of de-
mocracy and liberalism in the Arab world, critical voices in Turkey reminded 
the Prime Minister first to fully live up to liberal democratic standards at home 
before promoting democracy abroad. 
In conclusion, both the transformation of Turkey’s Islamists to Muslim con-
servatives and the political and economic reforms the country has experienced 
in the past decade have been utterly path-dependent. When the AKP took pow-
er in 2002, the major trajectories were already set. Moreover, at that point the 
country and its people have experienced more than 50 years of electoral democ-
racy and frequent shifts of governments through the ballot box. Of course, for 
decades Turkish democracy has suffered under the tutelage of the Kemalist 
state’s military and juridical institutions. However, the political and economic 
structures of Turkey have developed in fundamentally different ways from 
those in most Arab states. Moreover, at the turn of the century, Turkish society 
was not anymore willing to accept the Kemalist system of limited democracy. 
As much as the AKP has contributed to the recent transformation of Turkey, the 
party is also a product of the path-dependent institutional setting of the Turkish 
republic and decades of West-integration that have characterized the political 
history of the country. This does not exclude to take Turkey as a major point of 
reference in the transformation of authoritarian Arab states; elements of the 
Turkish experience might certainly help Arab actors to find their own ways to 
build democratic and economically prosperous societies. The AKP, however, is 
a very particular phenomenon and not a role model for political development 
or the transformation of Islamist movements. Moreover, after the AKP’s over-
whelming electoral success and its currently almost un-contested power posi-
tion in Turkish politics, the party itself has first to stay the test of time and 
prove that its image of Muslim democrats is true. 
 
 
